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Britain	cannot	and	should	not	imitate	the	Swiss
model	of	sectoral	bilateralism	with	the	EU
In	this	blog	post,	Joachim	Blatter	(University	of	Lucerne)	explains	why	Britain	cannot	and
should	not	imitate	the	Swiss	model	of	sectoral	bilateralism.	He	also	outlines	where	the	British	and
the	Swiss	could	join	forces	for	re-inventing	transnational	governance	and	democracy	in	Europe
after	Brexit.
Britain	cannot	imitate	the	Swiss	model	of	sectoral	bilateralism
In	Switzerland,	direct	forms	of	democracy	are	firmly	ingrained	and	not	just	applied	when	political	leaders	deem
them	appropriate	according	to	their	situational	strategic	rational.	The	direct-democratic	instrument	of	the	popular
initiative	gives	the	people	the	opportunity	to	put	an	issue	on	the	agenda,	and	the	obligatory	and	optional
referendums	provide	them	with	a	veto-right.	These	rights	are	widely	used;	the	number	of	popular	votes	in
Switzerland	are	by	far	the	largest	in	the	world.	Switzerland	is	the	most	decentralised	and	federalised	country	in
Europe.	The	horizontal	relationship	among	the	entities	of	the	Swiss	nation	state	is	primarily	determined	by	an
ideology	that	values	economic	and	fiscal	competition.	Finally,	Switzerland	holds	deer	to	so-called	Milizsystem.	It
expresses	the	idea	that	the	citizens	themselves	and	not	any	agents	or	representatives	defend	and	rule
themselves.
These	internal	features	of	the	Swiss	government	and	democracy	shaped	the	relationship	towards	the	European
Union.	In	economic	terms,	Switzerland	is	one	of	the	most	integrated	countries	in	the	European	common	market,
but	its	political	majority	always	resisted	any	political	integration	in	multilateral	institutions.	Instead,	it	opted	for
what	is	called	“sectoral	bilateralism.”	Usually,	this	term	refers	to	the	16	bilateral	agreements	which	were	signed	at
the	turn	of	the	millennium,	and	which	mostly	secure	the	Swiss	access	to	the	common	market,	but	also	the	free
movement	of	people	and	the	Swiss	participation	in	the	Schengen	and	Dublin	Agreements.	Nevertheless,	these
latest	agreements	represent	only	the	tip	of	the	iceberg	and	overall,	sectoral	bilateralism	encompasses	about	120
bilateral	agreements.
Switzerland	always	avoided	any	supranational	judicialization	in	all	these	treaties,	which	means	that	conflict
resolution	does	not	involve	any	court,	but	takes	place	in	the	form	of	intergovernmental	negotiations	in	bilateral
committees.	Nevertheless,	there	is	one	important	clause	in	the	cluster	of	bilateral	agreements	that	were	signed	in
1999	that	limits	the	leeway	of	Switzerland	dramatically:	the	so-called	“guillotine	clause”	stipulating	that	if	a	party
determines	one	agreement,	the	other	party	has	the	right	to	resign	all	other	agreements.
In	practice,	sectoral	bilateralism	comes	down	to	the	following	main	features:
1.	 In	many	policy	fields,	Switzerland	follows	the	regulatory	lead	of	the	European	Union	and	applies	similar
rules	in	a	procedure	that	is	called	“autonomer	Nachvollzug”	in	order	to	comply	to	the	rules	of	the	common
market.	In	crucial	policy	fields,	like	taxation	and	agriculture,	though,	Switzerland	has	avoided	any	binding
agreements.	This	formal	autonomy	has	allowed	Switzerland	to	defend	its	distinct	policies	(low	taxation	and
regulation	in	the	former	field;	strong	protection	and	subsidies	in	the	latter	field),	even	when	the	EU	tried	hard
to	force	Switzerland	to	abandon	its	egocentric	policies.	From	a	structural	point	of	view,	these	features
replicate	the	relationships	among	the	Swiss	cantons	on	a	higher	level.
2.	 As	it	is	within	the	Swiss	federation,	most	Swiss	prefer	to	have	a	lot	of	influence	in	some	crucial	policy	fields
like	taxation	in	comparison	to	have	a	little	bit	of	influence	in	all	policy	fields.	Therefore,	those	who	argue	that
EU	membership	would	bring	them	representation	and	a	vote	within	the	decision-making	institutions	of	the
European	Union	have	never	been	able	to	sway	the	majority	of	the	Swiss.	This	is	all	the	more	the	case
because	EU	membership	would	imply	a	massive	shift	away	from	the	traditional	republican	form	of
democracy	with	the	strong	element	of	direct	democracy	towards	a	liberal	and	representative	form	of
democracy.
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Great	Britain	resembles	such	a	liberal	and	representative	form	of	democracy.	In	consequence,	for	Britain	sectoral
bilateralism	represents	a	much	less	attractive	way	to	deal	with	the	EU	than	for	Switzerland.	For	Great	Britain,	a
much	larger	country	with	an	imperial	tradition,	it	is	much	harder	to	accept	a	relationship	in	which	you	usually
accept	and	implement	what	others	have	decided	on.	Given	its	own	understanding	as	a	leading	country	in	the
world	and	given	the	entrenched	reliance	on	a	representative	form	of	democracy,	the	gained	autonomy	in
important	fields	like	taxation	and	trade	agreements	is	much	less	able	to	compensate	for	the	loss	of	representation
and	voting	power	in	all	other	policy	fields	within	the	EU	institutions.
Overall,	whereas	for	Switzerland	sectoral	bilateralism	means	to	be	able	to	go	on	with	its	established	forms	of
governance	and	democracy,	for	Great	Britain	it	means	that	the	traditional	political	leadership	by	the	Premier
Minister	and	the	sovereignty	of	the	Westminster	parliament	would	be	limited	basically	to	pursue	its	own	taxation
and	trade	policy.	In	many	other	policy	fields,	though,	the	role	of	these	proud	institutions	will	shrink	towards
explaining	the	British	population	what	has	been	decided	in	Brussels	and	why	it	is	necessary	to	follow	suit.
Britain	should	not	imitate	the	Swiss	model	of	sectoral	bilateralism
Sectoral	bilateralism	does	not	represent	a	model	for	dealing	with	cross-border	flows	and	policy
(inter)dependencies	that	solves	the	fundamental	problems	of	democratic	self-determination	in	the	21st	century.	It
does	not	secure	national	sovereignty	in	any	meaningful	way.	Bilateralism	has	not	been	able	to	avoid	the
perceived	disconnection	between	the	political	elite	and	the	wider	population	and	therefore	provides	no	proper
answer	to	rising	populism.
The	Swiss	traditionally	have	done	everything	not	to	be	dominated	by	international	organizations	with	a	broad
political	agenda	and	hesitated	to	join	these	organisations.	This	aversion	against	any	influence	from	international
organizations	has	come	at	the	expense	of	becoming	very	dependent	on	fulfilling	the	demands	of	multinational
corporations	and	capital	holders.	Furthermore,	it	has	made	Switzerland	very	vulnerable	to	threats	uttered	by
powerful	states	like	the	United	States.	The	latter	aspect	showed	up	most	clearly	a	few	years	ago,	when	US
authorities	used	a	threat	against	the	largest	bank	of	Switzerland	in	order	to	crack	the	famous	Swiss	banking
secrecy.	In	this	situation,	the	Swiss	realised	what	it	means	to	have	no	allies	in	a	conflict	with	a	global	hegemon.
Image	by	James
Case,	(Flickr),	licenced	under	(CC	BY	2.0).
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The	obedience	towards	multinational	corporations	is	the	most	important	aspect,	though,	since	it	shapes	Swiss
policy-making	tout	court.	The	choice	by	the	political	elite	of	Switzerland	to	cater	to	the	demands	of	multinational
corporations	and	capital	holders,	and	to	shy	away	from	joining	forces	with	the	political	leaders	of	other	democratic
states	for	regulating	and	taxing	these	private	actors,	has	paid	off	so	far	in	economic	terms.	For	example,	Swiss
banks	still	manage	about	one-fourth	of	the	global	offshore	wealth.	Nevertheless,	this	strategy	has	reduced	the
political	leeway	of	the	Swiss	people	in	a	similar	way	as	it	is	the	case	with	the	political	leeway	of	nations	that	are
members	of	the	European	Union.
When	the	OECD,	backed	up	by	the	G20,	put	pressure	on	Switzerland	to	get	rid	of	cantonal	taxation	rules	that
contained	massive	discounts	for	multinational	corporations,	the	Swiss	government	reacted	by	introducing	a	bill
that	would	have	forced	the	cantons	to	provide	not	only	the	multinationals	but	all	corporations	with	very	low	tax
rates.	The	people	rejected	this	bill	in	a	referendum,	not	at	least	because	they	saw	what	happens	when	not	just
the	very	small	cantons	like	Zug	pursue	a	strategy	of	very	low	corporate	taxation,	but	also	larger	cantons.	Lucerne,
reduced	its	corporate	tax	rate	to	10%	a	few	years	ago,	in	order	to	keep	up	with	the	tax	policies	of	the	many	small
cantons	in	its	neighbourhood.	Huge	budget	deficits	have	been	the	result	since	the	newly	attracted	corporations	do
not	make	up	for	the	reduced	public	income	from	the	established	corporations.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	economy
is	striving,	the	cantonal	government	has	had	to	introduce	each	year	a	new	cost-cutting	program.	On	the	national
level,	a	new	corporate	tax	bill	is	currently	worked	out,	and	it	looks	like	that	it	will	differ	only	slightly	from	the	one
that	the	people	rejected.	This	is	because	according	to	widely	held	opinion	“there	is	no	alternative”	to	finding	new
ways	to	secure	low	corporate	taxation.	In	a	situation	in	which	the	international	community	is	not	tolerating	the
older	discriminatory	instruments	anymore,	the	dependency	of	Switzerland	on	multinational	corporations	makes	an
increase	in	taxation	so	risky	that	for	most	politicians	and	commentators	is	has	become	unthinkable.
The	Swiss	only	superficially	obey	to	the	will	of	the	international	community	but	de	facto,	they	follow	much	more	to
the	demands	of	multinational	corporations.	Being	a	non-member	of	the	EU	does	not	mean	to	have	more
sovereignty;	it	means	that	you	follow	more	or	less	voluntarily	the	demands	of	a	different	kind	of	international
actor.
One	of	the	reasons	for	the	rise	of	populism	all	across	Europe	and	for	the	support	of	the	LEAVE	campaign	in
Britain	is	the	widespread	perception	that	the	political	elites	have	become	detached	from	the	people.	Furthermore,
it	is	usually	presumed	that	the	EU	with	its	intergovernmental	and	supranational	forms	of	policy-making	strongly
contributes	to	this	development.	The	Swiss	example	shows	that	bilateralism	does	not	prevent	the	emerging
disconnect	between	political	elites	and	ordinary	people.	In	bilateral	system	of	international	relations,	the	political
interactions	between	actors	within	the	domestic	arena	and	actors	from	outside	are	taking	place	primarily	in	the
form	of	intergovernmental	negotiations,	whereas	in	multilateral	and	supranational	systems	like	the	EU,	further
points	of	contact	emerge	on	the	level	of	civil	society	and	intermediary	organizations	(like	parties,	interest
organizations	and	media	outlets).	In	consequence,	within	the	domestic	arenas	and	debates,	it	is	almost	only	the
government	that	brings	in	the	perspectives	of	the	external	others	when	it	tries	to	justify	the	negotiated
compromises.
The	British	and	the	Swiss	should	join	forces	to	push	for	a	less	legalistic	form	of	international	cooperation
and	European	Integration
Despite	the	many	differences	between	the	British	and	the	Swiss	forms	of	democracy,	there	is	one	aspect	the
British	and	the	Swiss	very	much	agree	on:	the	scepticism	against	a	legalist	form	of	rule	and	the	aversion	against
“foreign	judges.”	Currently,	the	EU	follows	the	legalistic	idea	that	transnational	flows	and	(inter)dependencies
should	be	regulated	primarily	by	a	joint	system	of	international/European	law	implying	that	judges	have	the	last
word	in	political	conflicts.
Both,	Switzerland	and	Great	Britain	do	not	share	the	prioritization	of	the	rule	of	law	over	the	rule	of	the	people	that
has	its	roots	in	the	Roman	Empire	and	that	shapes	especially	the	German	understanding	of	democracy	and	the
German	stance	towards	European	integration.	They	give	the	people	or	the	representatives	of	these	people	in	the
parliament	the	last	word	in	political	conflicts.	In	consequence,	the	British	and	the	Swiss	could	join	forces	in	order
to	use	their	current	negotiations	with	the	EU	for	spreading	new	innovative	ideas	on	how	to	deal	democratically
with	a	world	of	massive	cross-border	flows	and	(inter)dependencies.
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One	of	those	ideas	is	to	develop	a	transnational	voting	schema	in	which	European	states	reserve	a	limited
number	of	seats	in	their	national	parliaments	for	representatives	of	other	nations	(as	currently	do	some	EU
countries	like	Italy	or	France	for	their	external	citizens).	If	elected	representatives	of	other	nations	would	have	a
voice	(and	a	conditional	vote)	in	national	parliaments,	the	external	effects	of	national	policies	and	the
consequences	of	policy	interdependencies	would	be	debated	in	those	political	fora	that	are	much	better
embedded	in	the	structures	and	processes	of	democratic	will-formation	and	decision-making	than
intergovernmental	summits	and	the	EU	parliament.	Such	a	transnational	voting	schema	is	based	on	the	principle
of	reciprocity;	national	parliamentarians	grant	elected	representatives	of	another	nations	only	a	place/seat	in	their
midst,	if	the	members	of	the	other	parliament	are	doing	the	same.	This	makes	the	idea	applicable	to	multilateral
and	bilateral	settings;	EU	members	and	non-members	could	participate	in	such	an	attempt	to	bring	politics	back
closer	to	the	people	without	falling	back	to	times	of	competitive	nationalism.
We	are	currently	using	the	debates	on	a	transnational	voting	district	in	the	EU	parliament	for	propelling	our	idea	to
develop	a	truly	transnational	voting	space	with	a	focus	on	national	parliaments.	Information	on	this	project	can	be
found	here.				
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	of	the	LSE.
Joachim	Blatter	is	Professor	of	Political	Science	at	the	University	of	Lucerne	since	2008.				
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